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I. Introduction  
The last three decades of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a number of issues 
that spurred intensive discussions amongst economists. In the seventies, policymakers grappled 
with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the emergence of stagflation in the 
aftermath of the OPEC-induced oil shock. The eighties witnessed animated debate about the 
supply-side tax cuts during the Reagan era in the US and the emergence of corporate mergers 
and acquisitions and junk bonds as major financial phenomena. Finally, in the nineties, 
economists devoted their attention towards the ‘new’ (read, ICE)1 economy and the ‘taming’ of 
business cycles. However, although the world quickly adjusted to flexible exchange rates and 
while wild gyrations in the equity prices of tech-stocks have ceased to make headlines anymore, 
one phenomenon continues to attract the attention of economists through the decades: fragility of 
the banking system.  
From Sweden to Argentina and from the United States to Japan, banks seem to ‘go bust’ 
with monotonic regularity. Between 1945 and 1971, there was only one banking crises in Brazil in 
1963 in the sample of 21 industrial and emerging markets (Bordo and Eichengreen, 1999). In 
contrast, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of banking crises with recurring 
frequency. The IMF, for instance documented 54 banking crises between 1975 and 1997 (IMF, 
1998), while the World Bank listed as many as 117 systemic banking crises in 93 countries since 
the late 1970s till 1999 (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003). The reasons for the same are not too far to 
seek. Driven by the twin forces of liberalisation and innovation, the financial landscape has 
witnessed a virtual metamorphosis over the past three decades. This has resulted in a substantial 
increase in the importance of the financial sector: permitting the channelisation of a greater 
proportion of resources and enabling the development of new techniques for mobilisation of 
savings and allocation of investment. The net effect of these developments have been the 
unlocking of a greater volume of investible resources and their allocation into high-productivity 
outlets, promoting faster routes of growth and sounder economic development. On the flip side, 
however, this transformation of the financial marketplace has extended and tightened linkages 
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across markets and institutions, increased the uniformity of the information set available to 
economic agents and encouraged greater similarity in the assessment of information. This, in 
effect, has meant that weaknesses in the financial system can have serious and far more 
disruptive economic ramifications than was previously the case and engender contagion effects 
extending well beyond national boundaries. Evide n c e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  s a m e ,  b o t h  a t  t h e  
international and national levels has been quite abound. At the international level, the Mexican 
crisis of 1994-95, the East-Asian crisis of 1997-98 and more recently, the Argentine crisis that 
began in 2001 and is still far from reaching its end is ample testimony to this fact. At the national 
level, the banking crises in the Nordic countries in the 1980s; the problems in Philippines and 
Korean banking systems in the 1990s and the financial bubble in Japan whose costs are being felt 
even today come immediately to mind. The problem has been compounded by the fact that the 
financial industry itself is in a state of flux. Financial instruments have become more and more 
complex, with greater power to disaggregate and transfer risk. More importantly, the boundaries 
between different types of financial market activities (lending, trading, insuring) have become 
increasingly blurred, as financial instruments have assumed multiple characteristics. Policy 
makers are, therefore, compelled to look at the industry through the proverbial crystal ball, rather 
than in retrospect. All in all, there is growing realization that promoting healthy financial 
institutions, especially banks, is a crucial policy challenge confronting policymakers throughout 
the world.  
There are two primary ways of monitoring banks. The one traditionally employed in the 
banking industry is developing, implementing and sanctioning non-compliance with norms of 
behaviour (regulation) and monitoring these norms (supervision). The other is the corporate 
governance practice, which helps suppliers of finance to the bank assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment. However, the fact that supervisory standards may be lax or even 
virtually non-existent has been vividly illustrated in some of the crisis-ridden Asian economies. 
The lessons from the Barings debacle and the more recent accounting irregularities in the US have 
provided graphic evidence that corporate governance standards by themselves might not be 
adequate to stave off bank failures. A suggestion has, therefore, been made that supervisors 
should rely on ‘market discipline’ to supplant the traditional procedures. This enables market 
assessment of banking firms on a closer and continuous basis, enabling authorities to act sooner 
(thus avoiding costly delay) in case of any eventuality, because they can marshal independent 
evidence about the firm’s condition.  
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Market discipline is a process by which investors (bondholders/ depositors) assess changes in 
bank risk and take actions leading to the adoption of those measures needed to control the 
institution’s level of risk. The idea of leveraging market discipline to supplement supervisory 
efforts and corporate governance practices is by no means new. As Greenspan (2001) has 
remarked, ‘the real pre-safety-net discipline was from the market, and we need to adopt policies 
that promote private counterparty supervision as the first line of defense for a safe and sound 
banking system’. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on modernization of financial services enacted in 
1999 in the US reveals an increasing emphasis on market discipline. Even the proposed capital 
Accord of the Basel Committee has designated market discipline as one of the three pillars on 
which future financial regulation should be based, because ‘[market] discipline imposes strong 
incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner” and expects 
that the approach ‘will encourage high disclosure standards and enhance the role of market 
participants in encouraging banks to hold adequate capital’ (Basel, 1999). 
Two types of market discipline have been distinguished in the literature: direct and 
indirect. Direct market discipline refers to the control (or influence) that market participants have 
over a bank's behavior, including decisions on investment, financing, and operations. Such 
discipline is exerted through a risk-sensitive financial instrument when a banking organisation's 
expected cost of issuing that instrument changes with the firm's risk profile. To the extent that 
banks needs to issue debt on a fairly regular basis, direct market discipline often is thought of as 
exerted by debtholders rather than by stockholders (Kwan, 2002). Indirect market discipline, on 
the other hand, is pricing information from both the primary and the secondary markets of 
securities issued by banking organisations that provides a signal of the firm's risk level. When 
those market signals reflect an assessment of increased bank risk-taking, potential investors, 
uninsured depositors and other counter-parties of the banking organisation tend to demand 
higher returns on other bank instruments. Such signals provide useful leads to regulators in 
order to assess the firm's risk level. Among debt securities, it has been argued that subordinated 
notes and debentures (SNDs) are particularly well-suited in this respect, because they constitute 
one of the most junior of all bank debt instruments; that is, they are among the last debtholders in 
line to be compensated in full in case the bank runs into trouble. Together, the long maturity and 
the junior status of SNDs suggest that their yields should be more sensitive to the perceived risk 
of the issuing banking company than yields on other liabilities.  
There are a number of potential benefits from enhancing market discipline in a country’s 
banking sector. First, by punishing excessive risk-taking by banks, increased market discipline 
may reduce moral hazard incentives. Second, market discipline may improve the efficiency of 
banks by pressurising some of the relatively inefficient banks to become more efficient or to exit   4
the industry. Third, evidence indicates that markets give signals about the credit standings of 
financial firms, which, combined with inside information gained by supervisory procedures, can 
increase the efficacy of the overall supervisory process. Recent research suggests that market 
information may improve two features of the overall process for regulators by (a) enabling them 
to identify incipient problems more promptly, and (b) providing them an incentive and 
justification to take action more quickly, once problems have been identified. It is, therefore, 
important that market information be incorporated into the process of identifying and correcting 
problems. Finally, market discipline might be able to supplement traditional supervisory 
assessments to distinguish ‘good’ banks from ‘bad’ ones and therefore, lower overall social costs 
of bank supervision.  
The majority of the literature on market discipline focuses on the experience of the US 
banking industry. These studies have primarily followed three different approaches. The first set 
of studies have chosen the price-(or yield) based approach. In particular, they employ yield 
spreads (the difference between the market yield on bank sub-ordinated debt and a risk-free asset 
like Government paper) as an indicator of the market’s perception of bank risk. Overall, the 
studies support the hypothesis that yields on uninsured deposits contain risk premia. This, in 
effect, implies that uninsured depositors charge higher interest rates to riskier banks. A second 
set of studies adopts the quantity-based approach by analysing to what extent a bank is able to 
raise (uninsured) debt. For example, it was observed that in the 1990s, relatively weak banks 
were unwilling (or unable) to issue sub-ordinated debt in bad times. This, in effect, would 
indicate that that the risk-premia for weak banks to issue sub-ordinated debt was substantially 
high. The final set of studies combine both the price- and quantity-based approaches. These 
papers examine market discipline by looking at the effect of depository’s institution risk on both 
the pricing and growth of uninsured deposits. Overall, these studies find that riskier banks pay 
higher interest rates, but, at the same time, attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits. 
While the literature on market discipline in the banking sector is quite extensive, the 
same for emerging economies is admittedly limited. A case study of market discipline for 
Colombian banking sector reveals that depositors prefer banks with stronger fundamentals and 
that banks tend to improve their fundamentals after being ‘punished’ by depositors. A more 
comprehensive study for three Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile and Mexico) observed 
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III. Market Discipline and Indian Banking 
It needs to be recognized that the potential benefits of market discipline could be particularly 
important in emerging markets, where financial systems are predominantly bank-based and 
India is no exception to the rule. However, there has been very little research regarding the 
existence or otherwise of market discipline in emerging economies such as India. This is 
surprising, more so in view of the fact that, over the last decade, India has undertaken a process 
of liberalization of the banking sector, driven by the need for ‘creating a market-driven, 
productive and competitive economy’ in order to ‘support higher investment levels and 
accentuate growth’ (Government of India, 1998). More importantly, it seems appropriate to 
conduct a study of market discipline for India, since it has made significant efforts to promote the 
role of market forces in regulating banks. Illustratively, over the last few years, bank supervisors 
have undertaken steps towards improving the quality and availability of information on banks. 
These disclosures have gradually been enhanced over the years in order to provide a clearer 
picture of banks’ balance sheet to market players in order to enable them t o make informed 
decisions. The import of market discipline has been recognised by the Reserve Bank wherein it 
has been observed that ‘processes of transparency and market disclosure of critical information 
describing the risk profile, capital structure and capital adequacy are assuming increasing 
importance in the emerging environment. Besides making banks more accountable and 
responsive to better-informed investors, these processes enable banks to strike the right balance 
between risks and rewards and to improve the access to markets. Improvements in market 
discipline also call for greater coordination between banks and regulators’ (Jalan, 2002). 
A recent study addresses this topic by examining the existence of market discipline in the 
Indian banking sector (Ghosh and Das, 2003). In particular, the study considers two specific 
aspects of market discipline, viz., (a) do bank fundamentals influence depositor willingness to 
entrust deposits at a particular bank? and, (b) do differences among bank groups affect the 
degree of market discipline in the banking sector?  
Towards this end, the study utilizes several periods of data for 72 commercial banks 
(cross-section), comprising of 27 public sector banks, 20 private sector (including 8 new private 
banks) and 25 foreign banks, for which consistent data is available from 1996 through 2002 (time 
period), the most comprehensive time frame for which data on the concerned variables are 
available. The data on ‘outlier’ foreign banks (those with exceedingly high capital ratios and/or 
single bank branches) and several old and new private banks (which have since been 
merged/amalgamated) have been excluded from the sample. The data is annual in nature and 
the relevant information has been culled from published sources.    6
In terms of the econometric methodology, reduced-form equation has been estimated, 
where the dependent variable (quantity or price) has been regressed on a set of bank-specific, 
banking-industry (or systemic) and macroeconomic variables. The bank-specific variables are 
guided by the CAMEL methodology2 and covers the five major parameters of bank operations. 
These variables are included with a lag to account for the fact that the risk characteristics of banks 
is known to depositors with a certain delay. The systemic variables seek to ascertain the impact of 
significant policy changes impinging on the banking sector. Finally, the macro-economic 
variables control for the influence exerted by the state of the overall economy. Since market 
discipline can be exerted either through the quantity or the price channel, the dependent variable 
accordingly, can either be a quantity or a price variable. The quantity variable has been proxied 
by logarithm of first difference of time deposits, since this is the major and stable component of 
aggregate deposits. On the other hand, the price variable has been proxied by the ratio of interest 
paid on deposits to total deposits (also called the implicit deposit interest rate). Going by the 
research hypothesis, examining whether riskier banks attract lower deposits (quantity channel) or 
alternately, provide higher interest rates on deposits (price channel) is expected to provide 
insights regarding the existence of market discipline.  
The findings of the analysis revealed that, while bank-specific factors have an important 
bearing on the dependent variable in case of public sector banks, systemic factors, and in 
particular, policy announcements, in addition to bank-specific indicators, tend to be dominant in 
case of private banks. For foreign banks, the macroeconomic condition tends to overwhelm bank-
specific factors in explaining depositor behaviour. Nonetheless, the capital ratio is a key 
determinant of depositor behaviour for Indian banks, in general. In case of public sector banks, 
bigger banks (defined in terms of their total assets) does not translate into higher deposit growth, 
suggesting that depositors are not particularly sensitive to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect. For private 
and foreign banks, there exists evidence of contagion effects influencing the deposit accretion 
process. In sum, depositors ‘punish’ banks for risky behaviour, either by withdrawing deposits or 
by extracting higher price on deposits. This provides supports towards the existence of market 
discipline in the Indian banking sector.  
Two additional issues assume relevance in this context: first, does the existence of market 
discipline differ between insured and uninsured depositors? The significance of the question 
stems from the fact that assuming a credible deposit insurance scheme, one can expect insured 
depositors to have fewer incentives to monitor bank risk-taking vis-à-vis uninsured ones. Second, 
does the divestment of Government ownership in public sector banks have any bearing on 
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market discipline? Dilution of Government shareholding in public sector banks enables greater 
private participation, thereby possibly exerting greater prudence in their functioning. The findings 
revealed that (a) insured depositors exercise market discipline not so much by withdrawing their 
deposits from banks, but more by compelling them to pay a higher price on deposits and (b) 
lowering of Government ownership in public sector banks seems to have had limited effect on 
market discipline. Both these results seem intuitively appealing. As regards the first one, bank 
deposits in India are perceived as having an implicit Government guarantee in comparison to 
alternate avenues of deployment of resources. Consequently, although depositors tend to prefer a 
low-risk, low-return source of parking their funds (like bank deposits), they tend to discipline 
banks by extracting a higher price on such deposits. As regards the second one, it needs to be 
borne in mind that the amendments to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of 
Undertakings) Acts, 1970/80 in July 1995 have permitted public sector banks to raise capital up to 
49 per cent from the market. This, in effect, has implied that the divestment process in public 
sector banks has been driven by the need to augment their capital base, with the Government, 
being the majority shareholder, still having a major say in the functioning of bank boards. 
Consequently, although the Government shareholding in public sector banks has declined, it has 
not had a significant impact on market discipline. The proposed amendments to the Banking 
Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Bill, 2000 which seeks to reduce the 
minimum shareholding by Government in nationalised banks to 33 per cent is a welcome step in 
this regard.  
 
IV. Policy Concerns 
While the concept of market discipline is promising, several practical concerns require careful 
consideration. At the top of the list is its impact on risk-taking. The intent of market discipline is 
to constrain a bank from indulging in too much risk, because the market imposes higher 
financing costs on riskier transactions. However, a profit-maximizing bank can be expected to 
trade off risk and return at the margin. Thus, higher financing costs would not necessarily 
constrain risk-taking per se if those costs could be fully compensated by a higher risk-adjusted 
return.  
The second limiting issue is that for market discipline to be effective, investors must have 
timely and accurate information. This requires a high degree of transparency and an effective 
disclosure policy at banking organisations. Needless to state, policymakers are keenly aware of 
these requirements and are actively pursuing policies to enhance transparency and to improve 
disclosure in banking.   8
Third, the different channels through which depositors obtain information regarding 
bank fundamentals might impact market discipline unevenly. Depositors might access such 
information from a variety of sources, of which bank balance sheet is just one such. Alternative 
sources of information acquisition such as newspaper reports, internet or even financial advisors 
also exist. The differential access to these different sources can shed more light on what 
mechanisms promote more efficient market discipline.  
Fourth, owing to paucity of data on data on deposits according to different size classes or 
according to insured versus uninsured deposits at the bank-level, the study could not examine the 
behaviour of these two classes of depositors in isolation or even whether the behaviour of these 
two classes differs across bank groups. A much richer data set, incorporating this aspect into the 
study, can throw light on the inter-linkage between market discipline and deposit insurance.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Despite its potential advantages, market discipline can only complement, not substitute 
supervision, because the stake of the Government and the market participants in the financial 
system are not perfectly aligned. Even for the U.S., where market discipline is arguably the 
strongest, evidence suggests that neither supervisors nor rating agencies nor equity investors are 
unambiguously more timely and accurate in their assessment of risk than others. All three groups 
produce valuable complementary information that contributes towards improving the 
performance of large banks (Berger et al., 2000).  
  Thus, while there are clear limitations of the usefulness of market discipline, the global 
trend is towards placing increased emphasis on market discipline in the supervisory process. The 
idea is not that market monitoring can effectively replace official supervision, but that it has a 
potentially powerful role within the overall regulatory regime. In particular, it has the advantage 
of exploiting the synergies between supervision and market discipline and thereby increasing the 
efficacy of the overall supervisory process. In a recent contribution, Caprio and Honohan (1998) 
remind us, in a similar vein ‘broader approaches to bank supervision reach beyond the issues of 
defining capital and accounting standards, and envisage co-opting other market participants by 
giving them a greater stake in bank survival. This approach increases the likelihood that 
problems will be detected earlier…[it involves] broadening the number of those who are directly 
concerned about keeping the banks safe and sound’. 
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